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NOTE
Defining the "State as State": Is a
Nonprofit Corporation Under
Contract with a State to Perform
an Integral Government
Function Entitled to Immunity from
the Fair Labor Standards Act Under
National League of Cities?
By Steven K. Derian*
Introduction
In 1974 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
extending the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to
include most state and local government employees.1 In National
League of Cities v. Usery,2 the Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist,
found these amendments unconstitutional insofar as they operated to
displace directly the states' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions The Court relied upon
the Tenth Amendment4 and, analogizing to the doctrine of intergov-
ernmental immunity from taxation,5 stated that there are "attributes of
sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be im-
paired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Con-
* A.B., 1974, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., 1978, California State Univer-
sity, Long Beach. Member of the third year class.
1. Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259 § 6, 88 Stat. 55, 58-
59 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision).
3. Id at 852.
4. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5. 426 U.S. at 843 n.14.
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stitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner."6
In the course of its opinion, the Court declared that the "States as
States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corpo-
ration when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate
commerce." 7 Three recent cases have examined the precise meaning of
this pronouncement: Richland County Association for Retarded Citizens
v. Marshal,8 Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc. 9 and Skills
Development Services, Inc. v. Donovan.1° Each case involves the appli-
cability of the principles articulated in National League of Cities to a
nonprofit corporation under contract with a state to provide a tradi-
tional government service.
This Note explores the issues raised by the facts of these cases and
concludes that the decisional trend-that such nonprofit corporations
are private entities not entitled to sovereign immunity from federal reg-
ulation-is proper in light of the language and logic of NationalLeague
of Cities and its progeny.
I. Background: National League of Cities v. Usery and Hodel
v. Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.
By finding that the Tenth Amendment embodies a concept of state
sovereignty that acts as an affirmative limitation upon the federal com-
merce power, National League of Cities clearly breaks with recent con-
stitutional jurisprudence. The opinion overruled one case and
distinguished several others in which the Court, over a period of more
than thirty years, had held consistently that the authority of Congress
under the Commerce Clause is not limited by the Tenth Amendment."
6. Id at 845.
7. Id at 854.
8. 660 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 454 U.S. 389 (1982) (per curiam).
9. 669 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
10. 558 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), aft'd, 728 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1984).
11. The amendment simply states that those powers not delegated are reserved to the
states. See supra note 4. It does not purport to be a limitation on the powers that are dele-
gated. The view that the Tenth Amendment is an affirmative limitation upon the enumer-
ated powers of Congress was rejected by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Marshall's interpretation is bolstered by evidence
that the Senate originally refused to use the term "expressly delegated" because its use
would unduly confine the national government. I ANNALS OF CONG. 1790 (1971). Never-
theless, the Supreme Court, particularly between 1890 and 1937-a period that one scholar
has termed the era of "dual federalism," Corwin, The Passing ofDual Federalism, in ESSAYS
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (R. McCloskey ed. 1962)-struck down a number of federal stat-
utes as violative of those powers which the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states. See,
e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
In United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which unanimously upheld applica-
tion of the Federal Safety Applicance Act to the operation of a state owned railroad, the
Court rejected the notion that the Tenth Amendment limits the authority of Congress to
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The decision elicited a blistering dissent from Justice Brennan, 2 a
impose regulations upon the states, asserting that "It]he analogy of the constitutional immu-
nity of state instrumentalities from federal taxation, on which [California] relies, is not illu-
minating. That immunity is implied from the nature of our federal system... and is
equally a restriction on taxation by either of the instrumentalities of the other. . . . But
there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no
more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individ-
ual." Id at 184-85.
In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), a unanimous Court found the original
FLSA to be a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
Averring that an exercise of the commerce power of Congress was unaffected by any possi-
ble impact upon the powers reserved to the states, the Court declared: "[T]he Tenth Amend-
ment. . . states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is
nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution before the amendment. . . ." Id at 124.
This view of the authority of Congress to regulate the states under the Commerce
Clause commanded a majority of the Court in both Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)
(upholding the constitutionality of the 1966 amendments to the FLSA, which extended the
Act's coverage to employees of state schools and hospitals), overruled, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
and Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upholding the authority of Congress to freeze
temporarily the wages of state employees). Despite the holdings in Wirtz and Fry, there
were indications that some members of the Court were reconsidering the scope of the com-
merce power vis-a-vis the states. Dissenting in Wirtz, Justice Douglas wrote that the appli-
cation of the FLSA to employees of state hospitals and schools represented "such a serious
invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment. . . [that it was] not con-
sistent with our constitutional federalism." 392 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Although writing for the majority in Fry, Justice Marshall qualified the dicta in Darby,
conceding that "[w]hile the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism,' stating
merely that 'all is retained which has not been surrendered,' it is not without significance.
The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in
a federal system." 421 U.S. at 547 n.7. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Fry, argued that the
concept of state sovereignty implicated by the Tenth Amendment had been violated by ap-
plication of the wage freeze to state employees. 421 U.S. at 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In an argument similar to the one made by Douglas in his Wirtz dissent, Rehnquist analo-
gized to the area of federal taxation where federalism limits the power of the national gov-
ernment to tax the states. Criticizing the Court's rejection of this analogy in United States v.
California, Rehnquist asserted, "a line will have to be drawn somewhere." Id at 558 n.2. In
National League of Cities, decided just a little more than a year after Fry, a majority of the
Court was persuaded that the line had finally been crossed. The majority overruled Wirtz,
but distinguished California and Fry. Calfornia was distinguished as not involving an inte-
gral government function. 426 U.S. at 853. Fry was distinguished because, according to the
majority, the wage freeze involved there did not impermissibly infringe upon an integral
state function. Id at 853. Justice Brennan found the majority's attempt to distinguish Fry
particularly unconvincing. See infra note 18.
12. 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Among the adjectives used by Justice
Brennan to describe the majority's decision are "mischievous," id at 880, "ominous," id at
875, and "alarming," id at 875. Brennan pointed out that the decision ran counter to the
Court's recent interpretation of the Commerce Clause vis-a-vis the states and criticized the
analogy to intergovernmental immunity from taxation. Brennan's dissent was joined by
Justices White and Marshall.
Summer 19831
880 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:877
more temperate dissent from Justice Stevens, 13 and a great deal of
scholarly criticism.14
A principal criticism is that the opinion is ambiguous. 15  The
Court rested its holding on a concept of state sovereignty it claimed was
implicit in the Tenth Amendment and insisted that
[o]ne undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power
to determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they
employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what
hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be
provided where these employees may be called upon to work
overtime.' 6
Although contending that the resolution of the factual disputes over the
effects of the FLSA amendments was "not critical" to the case's dispo-
sition,'7 the Court nevertheless entered into a rather detailed analysis
of the amendments' potential impact upon the states.is Thus, it was
unclear to what extent the decision reflected a weighing of the nature
and extent of the federal interest in the regulated activity against the
regulation's actual impact on the states' ability to structure, and pay
13. 426 U.S. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens expressed "respect and a
great deal of sympathy for the views expressed by the Court" but was "unable to identify" a
limitation on the commerce power that would invalidate the 1974 amendments to the FLSA.
Id at 881.
14. See, e.g., Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaningfor the Tenth
Amendment? 1976 SUP. CT. REv. 161; Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Foot-
note to Holding-State Immunity From Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35;
Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty
Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1115 (1978).
15. The most obvious problem not resolved by the opinion was the precise definition of
traditional integral governmental functions. The Court cited fire prevention, police protec-
tion, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation as examples of protected activities,
but asserted there were "numerous" other activities that would qualify for exemption from
federal regulation. 426 U.S. at 851 n.16. Lower courts have attempted to determine the
scope of the exemption on a case by case basis. Compare Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,
598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) (operating a municipal airport an integral governmental func-
tion) and United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978) (licensing of automobile driv-
ers an integral governmental function) with Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, 699 F.2d
1060 (11th Cir. 1983) (local transit system not an integral governmental function) and
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977) (air pollution plans related to
highway and bridge regulation not an integral governmental function).
16. 426 U.S. at 845.
17. Id at 846.
18. Id at 846-48. In addition, the Court distinguished Fry on the grounds that the 1970
wage freeze was temporary, tailored to combat a national emergency, displaced no state
choices about how governmental operations should be structured, and operated to reduce,
rather than increase, the pressures upon state governments. 426 U.S. at 853. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent criticized this distinction, arguing that it was "sophistry" to assert that the wage
freeze displaced no state choices and "absurd to suggest that there is a constitutionally sig-
nificant distinction between curbs against increasing wages and curbs against paying wages
lower than the federal minimum." Id at 872. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
for, their traditional governmental functions. This ambiguity was exac-
erbated by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in which he admit-
ted, "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me that it
adopts a balancing approach and does not outlaw federal power in ar-
eas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is de-
monstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed
federal standards would be essential."' 19
Another area of ambiguity is the precise meaning of the Court's
pronouncement that the "States as States stand on a quite different
footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exer-
cise of Congress' power to regulate commerce."2 The meaning of this
statement, and indeed of NationalLeague of Cities generally, was clari-
fied by the Supreme Court's decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing and Reclamation Association, Inc. 2 1
In Hodel, mine operators brought a pre-enforcement challenge to
the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act,22 claiming that the Act displaced state regulation in an area of
integral state functions-land use regulation-and thus violated the
Tenth Amendment under National League of Cities. A unanimous
Court, per Justice Marshall, rejected the operators' Tenth Amendment
claim after a "careful review of the actual basis and import" of the
decision in National League of Cities. 3 The Court in Hodel ruled that
in order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power
legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of
Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First there must
be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the 'States as
States.' 4 Second, the federal regulation must address matters
that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty.'25 And
third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the
federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.'26
The opinion incorporated Justice Blackmun's balancing test as a fur-
ther limitation on this analytical framework by providing in a footnote:
"[d]emonstrating that these three requirements are met does not, how-
ever, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional
commerce power action will succeed. There are situations in which the
19. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20. 426 U.S. at 854. The contrary dicta in United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 184-
85, was dismissed as "simply wrong." 426 U.S. at 855.
21. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
22. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
23. 452 U.S. at 286.
24. Id at 287 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
25. Id at 288 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
26. Id (quoting National League of Cities,. 426 U.S. at 852).
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nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
State submission."'27
The Court held that the mine operators' Tenth Amendment claim
failed because the first of the three requirements-that the challenged
statute regulate the states as states-was not satisfied.2 s The provisions
of the Surface Mining Act governed only the activities of the coal mine
operators. The state was not compelled to enforce the Act, expend any
state funds, or participate in the federal regulatory program in any
manner. The Court refused to look "beyond the activities actually reg-
ulated by the Act to its conceivable effects on the States' freedom to
make decisions in areas of 'integral governmental functions.' "29 While
conceding that congressional enactments preempting or displacing state
regulations of private activities affecting interstate commerce "obvi-
ously curtail or prohibit the States prerogatives to make legislative
choices respecting subjects the States may consider important," the
Court found that "the Supremacy Clause permits no other result."30
The Court concluded that the Tenth Amendment challenge to the Sur-
face Mining Act could not succeed because "in contrast to the situation
in National League of Cities, the statute at issue regulates only 'individ-
ual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the govern-
ment of the Nation and State in which they reside.' "II
The Hodel decision dispelled some of the ambiguity of National
League of Cities by making it clear that the Tenth Amendment does
not diminish the power of Congress to preempt state regulation of mat-
ters affecting interstate commerce, even when the activity is one that
traditionally has been regulated by the states.32 The mine operators at
whom the federal regulation was directed were not performing an inte-
gral government function, however, and could in no way be character-
ized as the alter-ego of the state. Thus, Hodel does not necessarily
answer the question raised in RichlandAssociationfor Retarded Citizens
v. Marshall,33 Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc. 4 and
27. Id at 288 n.29. This balancing test was later expressly approved in both United
Transp. Workers Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 684 n.9 (1982), and EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237-38 (1983).
28. 452 U.S. at 288.
29. Id at 289.
30. Id at 290.
31. Id at 293 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
32. In Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), a
sharply divided Court arguably went even further, holding that Congress may require the
states' regulatory agencies to take certain prescribed actions where the required actions were
less intrusive than federal preemption. The Court reasoned that where Congress could en-
tirely preempt State regulations, it is not unconstitutional for Congress to do something less.
Id at 765.
33. See supra note 8.
34. See supra note 9.
Skills Development Services, Inc. v. Donovan: whether, and under
what circumstances, an ostensibly private, nonprofit corporation under
contract with a state to perform an integral governmental function
might be considered sufficiently allied with that state to warrant ex-
emption from the FLSA under National League of Cities.
II. The Relevant Cases
A. The Strange Tale of Richland County Association for Retarded
Citizens v. Marshall
L The Facts
In 1973 the Montana Legislature passed an act designed to remove
developmentally disabled adults from large state operated institutions
by providing training and treatment for them in family oriented resi-
dences in local communities.36 The statute authorized the Develop-
ment Disabilities Division of the Montana Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services (DDD) either to operate such community
based homes directly or to contract with local nonprofit corporations to
establish and operate them.37 The Richland County Association for
Retarded Citizens (Association) was formed in 1975 with the encour-
agement and assistance of the DDD, which recruited Richland County
community members to establish a local facility. The Association then
contracted with the DDD to provide residential care and training for
eight mentally retarded adults at its Sydney Group Home (Home) in
Sydney, Montana.38
The state plays a significant role in the supervision and funding of
the Home. The DDD provided $9,000 to enable the Association to
make a downpayment on the Home and to furnish it.39 The Home is
required to make monthly reports to the DDD on the progress of each
client. The regional staff of the DDD advises the Association's board
of directors and its employees to make sure the contract is being per-
formed. 0 Funding to operate the Home comes primarily from the
state and federal governments.4' Each retarded citizen receives a
35. See supra note 10.
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-2001-07 (1973). The facts of this case were gleaned from
the district court opinion in Richland County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Donovon, No.
77-56 (slip op.) (D. Mont.) (on file HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.) and from Richland County
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 388, (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 454 U.S. 389
(1982).
37. Mont. Code Ann. § 2002 (1973).
38. 660 F.2d at 389.
39. Id
40. Id
41. In National League of Cities, the Court did not specifically address the question of
whether federal money granted a state to assist it in providing an integral governmental
service should have an impact on the state's immunity from Commerce Clause regulation.
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monthly Supplemental Security Income payment of $271.80, of which
$167.80 is federal and $104.00 is state money.42 The State provides the
Home with an additional $150.00 monthly per resident, this payment
being contingent upon the availability of federal matching funds.43
The Home also receives donations from the private sector.'
The Association, however, has control over most of the Home's
daily operation. Its contract with the DDD allows the Association to
maintain local control over "the methods, time, means and personnel
for furnishing purchased services" to the Home residents.4  This con-
trol is exercised by the Association's board of directors, which is elected
by the members of the Association.46 Among the responsibilities of the
board are hiring and paying the group home parents.47
The group home parents are solely responsible for the care and
supervision of the eight retarded clients during all hours that the clients
are in the Home. The purpose of having live-in parents is to maintain
a consistent, family like environment. The parents participate with the
clients in preparing the meals and maintaining the home. The contract
between the Association and the DDD classifies the home parents as
"professional" and provides that they be paid a monthly salary rather
than an hourly wage. It was pursuant to this contract that the Associa-
tion hired Bruce and Virginia Harmelink at a combined salary of $650
per month.48
2. The District Court's Decision
Eight months after their employment began, the Harmelinks asked
the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor
whether the FLSA was applicable to their employment. The Depart-
ment determined that the terms of the Harmelinks' employment vio-
lated the FLSA. The Association then brought suit against the
Two lower courts that have addressed the issue reached different conclusions. Compare
Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, 505 F. Supp. 880, 890 (S.D. Ga. 1981), modfed, 699
F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983) (since the Court's opinion in National League of Cities did not
mention the federal assistance programs that give financial aid to state and local govern-
ments providing integral governmental services, the existence of such aid must be irrelevant
in determining the scope of the opinion) with Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare
Agency, 525 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1981) aff'd, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (balanc-
ing the federal and state interests requires consideration of the existence and extent of fed-
eral aid and regulation).
42. 660 F.2d at 389 n.4. The Home retains $245.20 for its operation and maintenance;
the remaining $26.60 is allocated to the individual resident for personal needs.
43. Id
44. Id
45. 660 F.2d at 389.
46. Id.
47. Id
48. This amount was raised to $800 and later to $900 per month.
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Secretary of Labor seeking a declaratory judgment that it was exempt
from the Act's provisions. The Secretary counterclaimed to enjoin the
Association from violating the Act. The district court, relying on Na-
tional League of Cities, held that application of the FLSA to employees
of the Home would violate the Tenth Amendment.49 In a decision
reached two years before the Supreme Court decided Hodel, the district
court reasoned that "application of the requirements of the Act would
inevitably result in displacement of one or more of the State of Mon-
tana's considered policy choices in carrying out its traditional functions
of caring for the mentally handicapped."5 In addition, the court as-
serted that "the financial burdens required by the minimum wage pro-
visions of the Act would severely affect the State's fiscal decision-
making in the area of services to the mentally handicapped."5 The
court conceded that the DDD could "circumvent the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act by terminating all contracts with nonprofit
homes and having the Department itself establish group homes,"
thereby making the home parents state employees. The evil in this ap-
proach, as viewed by the district court, was that it would "require at
least a partial abandonment of Montana's policy of semi-autonomous,
locally controlled facilities." 52 The court concluded that although the
Association was "unquestionably" an entity distinct from the State of
Montana, the Home was the "alter-ego" of the State and so was enti-
tled to immunity from the FLSA.53
3. The Ninth Circuit's Opinions
The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion which also antedated Hodel,
agreed that the Home was Montana's "alter-ego" and affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision. 4 Judge Frye's majority opinion concluded that
although National League of Cities "applies to the States as States...
[it] does not require direct state involvement."5 5 "The key issue," ac-
cording to Judge Frye, is "whether the operation of the Home is an
'integral government function' within the scope of National League of
Cities."56 Using a test developed by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v.
City of Cleveland,7 the majority concluded that operation of the Home
49. Richland County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Donovan, No. 77-56, slip op. at 12
(D. Mont. 1977).
50. Id at 4.
51. Id.
52. Id at 11-12.
53. Id at 12.
54. Richland County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Donovan, 91 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
34,018, withdrawn, (Aug. 21, 1981).
55. 91 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 34,018 at 49,682.
56. Id
57. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). The test consists of four elements: "(1) the govern-
mental service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is available to the public at
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was such an integral government function. Implicit in this analysis was
the notion that, under National League of Cities, states have the sover-
eign right to contract out to the private sector for performance of a
service qualifying as an integral governmental function because the
performance of such a function would "insure the presence of tradi-
tional and substantial state involvement."58
Judge Frye, joined in her opinion by Judge Wright, wrote over the
vigorous dissent of Judge Alarcon. Alarcon believed National League
of Cities principles were not implicated by these facts. "Under Usery,"
argued Alarcon, "it is unnecessary to determine whether the service
performed is a traditional governmental function if the employer is in a
private sector. . . ."9 Alarcon found "troubling" the majority's asser-
tion that federal minimum wage and hour laws interfere with state sov-
ereignty by increasing the cost of contracting out to private business.60
He contended that states have no inherent Tenth Amendment right to
demand that contracts with private business always be cheaper or more
desirable than providing the services themselves. Alarcon acknowl-
edged that the majority's position had a "superficial attraction in this
case, where the state's decision to use a private corporation to imple-
ment a most laudable program may have made that program prohibi-
tively expensive," but concluded that since "[vlirtuafly every other
'integral' state function-including police, fire, education, health serv-
ices, refuse collection--could conceivably be contracted out to private
businesses," the attraction must be resisted.6' Alarcon characterized
the majority's decision as "an open invitation to states and municipali-
ties to solve their fiscal problems by contracting out their services to
private companies which would then be freed from any legal obligation
to pay decent wages or set reasonable working hours," and argued that
"[sluch a result cannot be required by the Tenth Amendment."62
little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity is undertaken for the purpose of public
service rather than for pecuniary gain; (3) the government is the principal provider of the
service or activity; and (4) the government is particulary suited to provide the service or
perform the activity because of a community wide need." Id. at 1037. The court in Amer-
sbach used this test in determining that the operation of a municipal airport is an integral
governmental function. This test also has been applied by a number of other courts to deter-
mine whether an activity is an integral government function. See, eg., Alewine v. City
Council of Augusta, 505 F. Supp. 880, 888 (S.D. Ga. 1981), modfied, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th
Cir. 1983); Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburgh, Kan., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296
(D. Kan. 1980). The test, however, is designed to help determine whether a particular activ-
ity is an integral governmental function. It is not necessarily relevant when the question is
whether an entity is the "state as state."
58. 91 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 34,018 at 49,683.
59. Id (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
60. Id at 49,684.
61. Id
62. Id
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On August 21, 1981, apparently in response to the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Hodel that federal legislation enacted pursu-
ant to the commerce power must regulate the "States as States" before
the Tenth Amendment is implicated, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its
first Richland opinion (Richlandl), and on October 9, 1981 issued Rich-
land County Association for Retarded Citizens v. Marshall63 (Richland
I]). The new majority, consisting of Judges Alarcon and Wright, held,
per Alarcon,
Richland is in the same position as the private entities in Hodel.
The FLSA operates directly on Richland, a private corporation.
Thus the requirement that the regulation operate on a state as a
state is not met. Consistent with Hodel, we must hold that the
FLSA is constitutionally applicable to Richland."
Judge Frye, dissenting in Richland 11, reiterated her earlier argu-
ment that "[b]ecause [the Association] essentially stands in the position
of the State of Montana in providing an integral government service,
and because the minimum wage/maximum hour requirements of the
FLSA as applied to. . . [the Association] constitute direct interference
with Montana's exercise of its sovereignty" the majority's decision vio-
lated the principles of National League of Cities. 5
4. The Supreme Court's Decision
On appeal, the Supreme Court disposed of the case without reach-
ing the merits.6 The Court found that it was without jurisdiction to
decide the case which, because it had been decided against a depart-
ment of the federal government on constitutional grounds, should have
come directly to the Supreme Court from the district court.67 The per
curiam opinion also found that the Ninth Circuit had been without
jurisdiction and ordered that both Richland I and Richland II be va-
cated.68 This disposition of the case let stand the decision of the district
63. 660 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 454 U.S. 389 (1982) (per curiam).
64. Id at 391. Judge Alarcon reiterated the arguments he made in his Richland I dis-
sent, emphasizing that in NationalLeague of Cil/es the Court considered Congress' authority
to apply minimum wage and maximum hour regulations to the states "in their capacities as
sovereign governments." Id at 390 (quoting 426 U.S. at 837).
65. 660 F.2d at 392 (Frye, J., dissenting). Judge Frye stated that "[t]his [dissent] is
based on these facts and does not mean that states will have the right to haphazardly con-
tract all services to the private sector at a labor rate cheaper than that for equivalent services
provided by the private sector exclusively." Id
66. Richland County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Marshall, 454 U.S. 389 (1982).
67. Id The Court based its ruling on 28 U.S.C. § 1252, which states: "any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment ... holding an Act of
Congress unconstitutional in any civil action ... to which the United States ... or any
officer or employee thereof... is a party."
68. 454 U.S. at 389. In disposing of the appeal, the Court made reference to three stat-
utes which together worked to deprive the government of its right of appeal. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1252, an appeal should have been taken directly to the Supreme Court from the
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court and provided the government with no avenue of appeal.
B. Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc.
L The Facts
The case of Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc. 69 is
more complex than Richland. Eastside is one of twenty-five mental
health centers in Alabama. Two are operated by governmental agen-
cies, twenty are incorporated as public corporations" and three, includ-
ing Eastside, are incorporated under the Alabama nonprofit
corporations statute.7 '
Before being established as a nonprofit corporation in 1975, East-
side was part of the Jefferson-Blount-St. Clair Mental Health Authority
(Authority), a public corporation that coordinates mental health care in
a three county region.7 2 Eastside was established as a separate entity
when the Authority, which disburses state funds to all mental health
centers within its region, faced conflict of interest charges by other cen-
ters competing with Eastside for funds.73 Eastside was incorporated as
a nonprofit corporation because the community health center statute
allows only one facility per county to be incorporated as a public
corporation.74
Eastside's general purpose is to provide comprehensive mental
health services to a prescribed geographic area.75  Eastside provides
district court. Because the government failed to file an appeal or request an extension within
thirty days after the district court's decision, its right of appeal was extinguished by 28
U.S.C. § 2101(a). The Ninth Circuit had been without jurisdiction because of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1281, which provides the circuit courts of appeals with jurisdiction over all final decisions
of district courts except when direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
The Richland case presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to interpret
§ 1252 under these circumstances. Justices Powell and Blackmun dissented, arguing that the
Court's action was at cross purposes with 28 U.S.C. § 1252, which was "'designed to expedite
[review by the Supreme Court] not defeat it." 454 U.S. at 392. (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Department of Labor discovered its error while preparing its appeal from Richland
1. Because this appeal contended, inter alia, that the Ninth Circuit had been without juris-
diction to decide Richland 1, the Department continued to press its appeal even after the
Ninth Circuit had reversed itself.
69. 669 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
70. The public corporations are incorporated under ALA. CODE § 22-51-2 (1967).
71. ALA. CODE § 10-3-1-172 (1955).
72. 669 F.2d at 673.
73. Id
74. The district court in Eastside determined that § 22-51-2 allows for the incorporation
of only one public community health center per county. 509 F. Supp. 579, 581 (N.D. Ala.
1980). This limitation does not appear on the face of the statute. See ALA. CODE § 22-51-2
(1967). The Eleventh Circuit apparently was confused by the district court's finding but did
not challenge it. 669 F.2d at 674 n.3.
75. Alabama first begin treating mental patients in its state hospitals in 1861. Until the
1960's, Alabama provided the bulk of its mental health services through large state mental
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these services through contracts with schools, hospitals, nursing homes
and other state agencies.76 One of the services Eastside provides is the
Transitional Home Program. This program operates as a "halfway
house," providing psychological rehabilitation services for individuals
recently released from state mental hospitals and for persons who
might otherwise be committed to a state mental hospital.
David Williams is a former Eastside employee who worked in
Eastside's Transitional Home Program from February, 1977 until May,
1979. William's job was to supervise and assist in training residents in
basic socialization skills. His work schedule routinely required him to
be on call for ninety-six hour shifts. During these shifts he was re-
quired to be at the center between 5 P.M. and 8 A.M.; otherwise, he
was permitted to leave if he was not needed. Eastside paid Williams a
fixed salary, which, during the course of his employment, was approxi-
mately $27,000 short of the minimum required under the FLSA.77
2. Eastside's Corporate Structure
Eastside's corporate structure differs significantly from that of the
Richland Association for Retarded Citizens. Eastside's board of direc-
tors is not internally elected; it is appointed by various community
agencies, with the majority of the board being appointed by public
agencies.78 Eastside's budget is subject to ratification by the Authority,
which also must ratify the appointment of all board members, includ-
ing those appointed by private organizations. Eastside's articles of in-
corporation provide that, upon dissolution, all of Eastside's assets will
vest in the Authority.79
Eastside is also somewhat different from the mental health centers
established as public corporations by the State of Alabama. All mem-
bers of the boards of directors of the public corporations are appointed
by elected county or municipal officials;8° furthermore, the public cor-
porations have the power of eminent domain.8 Asserting that the dif-
ferences between Eastside and the public corporations are of
institutions. In 1965 the Alabama Department of Public Health completed a two year, fed-
erally financed study to plan for statewide provision of mental health services. This study
recommended the establishment of a network of smaller mental health centers throughout
the state. Id at 673.
76. The center provides both inpatient and outpatient care, consultation and educa-
tional services, as well as specialized services for children, elderly persons, mentally retarded
persons, and persons with alcohol or drug related problems. Id at 675.
77. Id at 673.
78. Ten of the eighteen members of the Eastside board of directors are appointed by
agencies that both parties stipulated to be "public." Id at 674.
79. Id Federal regulations prescribe certain of Eastside's activities, as Eastside receives
about 38% of its funds from the federal government. Id
80. ALA. CODE § 22-51-8 (1967).
81. Id at § 22-51-11 (1967).
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constitutional dimension, Williams brought an action in federal district
court demanding compensation allegedly due him under the overtime
provisions of the FLSA.
3. The District Court's Decisions
The district court, in a pre-Hodel decision, granted Eastside's mo-
tion for summary judgment and declared the corporation exempt from
the FLSA under National League of Cities.82 The issue, according to
the court, was not merely whether Eastside was a public corporation
but whether it was performing a traditional governmental function. To
answer this question the court in Eastside, as had the Ninth Circuit in
Richland I, applied the test articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Amer-
sbach v. City of Cleveland.3 Finding that Eastside satisfied the Amer-
sbach test, the district court declared Eastside a "public corporation." 4
Williams petitioned for reconsideration on the ground that East-
side was not shown to be a political subdivision of the state as required
by National League of Cities. The district court granted the motion but,
in an opinion that also antedated Hodel, again found for Eastside, em-
phasizing that the "main issue" was whether Eastside provided a tradi-
tional governmental service.8 5 Citing National League of Cities, which
was characterized as standing for the proposition that "the FLSA may
not be applied 'to directly displace the States' freedom to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,' "86 the
court declared it "apparent that [Eastside] is part of the 'structure' that
the State of Alabama set up to provide mental health care services." 7
Despite its characterization of the "main issue," the district court
did address Williams' contention that an entity must first qualify as a
state or political subdivision in order to be entitled to immunity under
National League of Cities. Williams argued that the appropriate stan-
dard was the test used by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
to determine whether an entity is a political subdivision and therefore
exempt from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).8 8 To satisfy this test, an entity must be either: "(1) created
directly by the state so as to constitute departments or administrative
arms of the government or (2) administered by individuals who are
82. 509 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1980), rev'd, 669 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1982).
83. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). For a description of this test see supra note 57.
84. 509 F. Supp. at 581.
85. Id at 583.
86. Id (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (emphasis in original)).
87. Id at 583.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate."89
In response to this argument, the court in Eastside determined that
Eastside met step two of the test because "in this case Eastside's board
of directors is not elected but externally appointed by agencies ranging
from public or governmental to private organizations, the majority of
which come from the public or governmental sector." 90 Additional fac-
tors the court deemed worthy of consideration were that Eastside must:
submit copies of the minutes of its board meetings to the State Depart-
ment of Mental Health and to the Authority; submit to an audit and
review by the state and periodic visitation and review by the State De-
partment of Mental Health; and conform to the state standards for
mental health centers and the state competitive bid laws.91 The court
also noted that Eastside is exempt from payment of the state sales tax,
is a member of the state retirement and pension system, and is prohib-
ited from owning any real property.92
4. The Eleventh Circuit's Opinion
Plaintiff Williams, supported by a United States Department of
Labor amicus brief, appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.93 That court, focusing on the question of Eastside's sovereign
status, reversed the district court decision and ruled that the mental
health center was not entitled to an exemption from the FLSA under
National League of Cities.
The Court of Appeals began by noting: "[tihe overriding constitu-
tional concern faced by the Court in Usery, and thus by this Court in
the present case, is the problem of affixing a clear and workable bound-
ary between the two sovereignties in our federal system.194 The prob-
lem, observed the court, is that "there is no formula by which the line
may be plotted with precision in advance."95
After pointing out that in National League of Cities the Supreme
Court granted sovereign immunity from the FLSA to the "states and
their political subdivisions," the Eleventh Circuit found: "[t]he deter-
minative fact in this case simply is that the entity with which we are
89. 669 F.2d at 677. The Supreme Court has endorsed the NLRB test as used to deter-
mine whether a particular entity is entitled to an exemption from the NLRA. NLRB v.
Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1971); see infra note 102.
90. 509 F. Supp. at 584.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (lth Cir. 1982).
94. Id at 675.
95. Id at 676 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926)). The
Court added: "Precise legal guidelines easily applicable to particular fact situations do not
exist in cases such as this involving broad constitutional concepts such as that of sover-
eignty .... [O]ur job is compounded in this case by the borderline nature of the facts
before us." 669 F.2d at 678.
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dealing is not a state or a political subdivision of a state as defined by
the Court in Usery and in other cases involving similar issues. ' 96 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily upon the fact that
Eastside is a nonprofit rather than a public corporation.97 In essence,
the court concluded-as had the Ninth Circuit in Richland I-that a
state waives its sovereign immunity from the FLSA by contracting with
a private, nonprofit corporation for the performance of a traditional
governmental function.98
The court did not, however, base its decision solely upon East-
side's status as a nonprofit corporation. In determining that Eastside
was not a "political subdivision" of Alabama, the court applied the
NLRB test,99 based on "the simple fact that the precise term 'political
subdivision' is used in both the Usery case and the NLRB cases." ' 0
Applying this test to Eastside, the court concluded,
With respect to the board of directors, not only does the State of
Alabama not have control over the appointment of nearly one-
half of the board membership, in addition it has no power what-
soever to dismiss any of the board appointments. Members of
the board do not serve as representatives of the state or any of its
agencies. For this latter reason it is clear that no member of the
administrative board is directly responsible to a public official or
to the general electorate. Under the test set out in NLRB v. Natu-
ral Gas Utilit Dist., this factor indicates that Eastside is not a
political subdivision of the State of Alabama. The other controls,
while perhaps uncommon in the context of normal private corpo-
rations contracting with the states, must be viewed simply as
stringent licensing standards necessary to the effective implemen-
96. Id at 678. The court observed that "[t]he Court in neither the Usery nor the Hodel
case had to face this precise issue, as the nature of the regulated entities was not disputed in
either case." Id at 677 n.6. The court also noted that "the determination that a regulation
affects a state or its political subdivisions is not always a simple one to make. There exist
many public or quasi-public agencies the status of which, for purposes of determining a state
sovereignty question, is not easy to characterize." Id at 676-77.
97. The court found that Eastside's incorporation as a nonprofit corporation under ALA.
CODE § 10.3-1, rather than as a public corporation under § 22-51-2, rendered it "distinct
from many of the other community mental health centers operating in the state of Alabama
.669 F.2d at 678.
98. The court stated, "For whatever reason, Alabama did not elect to operate Eastside
as a state institution with state employees; instead it set up a not for profit corporation with a
separate, independent board of directors to administer it. Whatever may have been the
state's reason for doing it this way, it must live with the consequences. It cannot claim an
immunity based on a condition which it itself sought to avoid." 669 F.2d at 678.
99. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
100. 669 F.2d at 677 n.8. The court explained that "[alIthough these cases turn on the
construction of the Labor Relations Act and not on constitutional considerations of state
sovereignty, we find them helpful in our inquiry, and until the Court holds otherwise we will
adopt this approach." Id at 677.
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tation of the state's police power in the mental health arena.1
By borrowing principles from the NLRB cases, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit presumed that it is appropriate to determine the scope of the fed-
eral commerce power vis-a-vis the states by virtue of a test developed
by the NLRB to determine its jurisdiction under the National Labor
Relations Act. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has approved
the test for application to the NLRA,10 2 it seems incongruous that the
101. Id at 679 (citation omitted). The court concluded its discussion of this issue by
rejecting Eastside's contention that its exemption from the state sales tax and its employees
participation in the state retirement system demonstrated Eastside's entitlement to sovereign
immunity. The court observed that Alabama grants sales tax exemption to many private
businesses, id at 679 n.9 (citing ALA. CODE § 40-23-4 (1975)), and that membership in the
state retirement system is not limited to state agencies but is also available to employees of
"public or quasi-public organizations." Id (citing ALA. CODE § 36-27-6 (1975)). The court
reasoned that "assuming Eastside is considered a quasi-public organization, it may partici-
pate in the retirement system and yet still not be a state or public agency within the meaning
of the term as used in the Usery case." Id at 679. In dicta, the court concluded that the
furnishing of mental health services is not a traditional government function. Id at 679-80.
This conclusion, although beyond the scope of this Note, seems erroneous in light of Ala-
bama's long history of providing such services, see supra note 75, and the Court's express
designation in National League of Cities of the provision of public health services as an
integral government function. 426 U.S. at 851. For further criticism of this dicta see Note,
Quasi-Public Institution Not Protected From Fair Labor Standards Acts By State Sovereignty
Claim-Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 199, 210-12
(1983). See also United Transp. Workers Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 686
(1982). (National League of Cities Court's emphasis on traditional aspects of state sover-
eignty not intended to impose a static historical view of state functions generally immune
from federal regulation). But see Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d
1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (state "chore workers" assisting aged, blind and disabled public assist-
ance recipients in their homes were performing services traditionally performed by domestic
employees in the private sector and were therefore not performing in an integral government
function).
102. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600 (1971). In Haw-
kins County, the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee gas utility was a political subdivision
under the second prong of the test despite a NLRB determination to the contrary. The
Court acknowledged that the Board's construction of the broad statutory term was entitled
to "great respect," id at 605, but asserted that the NLRB had misapplied its own criteria.
Id
The Hawkins County Utility District was administered by a board of commissioners
appointed by an elected county judge, and subject to removal proceedings at the instance of
the Tennessee Governor, the county prosecutor or private citizens. Id The Utility District
had the powers of eminent domain and subpoena, was required to maintain public records,
had an automatic right to a public hearing, and was exempt from state and federal taxes.
The Court reasoned: "[r]espondent is therefore an entity 'administered by individuals [the
commissioners] who are responsible to public officials [an elected county judge]' and this
together with the other factors mentioned satisfies us that its relationship to the State is such
that respondent is a 'political subdivision' . I..." ld at 609.
In adopting the Board's test the Court failed to delineate what weight it had given to the
"other factors" in reaching its conclusion. This fact, as well as the ambiguity inherent in the
second prong of the test, has created difficulties for other courts attempting to apply the
criteria. See infra note 201. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the NLRB's test marks an
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NLRB criteria should acquire constitutional stature absent a principled
basis for their application. The problem of developing proper criteria
for determining when a corporate entity performing a traditional gov-
ernmental service should be considered a "political subdivision" for
purposes of the Tenth Amendment is addressed' 0 3 following a discus-
sion of the third case in this trilogy, Skills Development Services, Inc. v.
Donovan.'o4
C. Skills Development Services, Inc. v. Donovan
1. The Facts
Skills Development Services, Inc. is one of almost ninety nonprofit
corporations providing residential and rehabilitative services to men-
tally retarded and developmentally disabled residents in Tennessee,'
pursuant to contracts with the Tennessee Department of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation.10 6
The State of Tennessee has exhibited official concern for the men-
tally retarded for more than sixty years. In 1919, the legislature appro-
priated funds for the construction of the Tennessee Home for the
Feeble Minded, which opened in 1923 and was operated by the Ten-
nessee Department of Institutions. °7 In 1953, the legislature created
outer limit on the NLRA's exemption for "political subdivisions." The Court in Hawkins
County noted, "This case does not ... require that we decide whether the 'actual operations
and characteristics' of an entity must necessarily feature one or the other of the Board's
limitations to qualify an entity for the exemption." 402 U.S. at 605. In dissent, Justice
Stewart argued, inter alia: "The Court points to provisions that the records of the District be
available for public inspection, and that the commissioners of the District hold hearings and
make written findings. These factors are said to 'betoken a state, rather than a private,
instrumentality.' The question, however, is not whether the District is a state instrumental-
ity, but whether it is a 'political subdivision' of the State. And the provisions in question
hardly go to that issue." Id at 610 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
103. See infra notes 173-204 and accompanying text.
104. 558 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), aft'd, 728 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1984).
105. Brief for Appellants at 30, Skills Development Services, Inc. v. Donovan, 728 F.2d
294 (6th Cir. 1984).
106. Skills Development, Hardeman County Developmental Ser ice Center, Inc. and
Michael Dunn Center, Inc. brought a class action for declaratory judgment against the Sec-
retary of Labor. The representative corporations sought a judgment declaring that all non-
profit corporations which contract with Tennessee to provide residential or rehabilitative
services to developmentally disabled state residents be entitled to sovereign immunity from
the provisions of the FLSA. Hardeman and Michael Dunn have operated pursuant to con-
tracts with the state since each was incorporated in 1970 and 1971 respectively. Skills Devel-
opment was incorporated in 1979; it is the product of the merger of two preexisting nonprofit
corporations, the first of which began operating as the Jay Cee Community Home for Spe-
cial Education in 1962. Joint stipulation of facts at 3-7, Skills Development Services, Inc. v.
Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). For convenience, the class of corporate
plaintiffs is referred to as "Skills Development."
107. Id at 7. The Tennessee Department of Institutions was also the agency responsible
for operation of the state's prison system.
what is now known as the Department of Mental Health and Retarda-
tion (Department); in 1965, the legislature authorized the Department
to enter into contractual agreements with private individuals and insti-
tutions to facilitate its function of treating and educating the mentally
ill and mentally retarded. In 1969, employees of the Department as-
sisted local citizens groups throughout the state in organizing local,
nonprofit corporations and developing programs for retarded children.
Two years later, Department employees helped develop similar pro-
grams for adults. In 1972, pursuant to the recommendations of a spe-
cial committee appointed by the legislature, the adult program was
expanded. A Developmental Center Office was established in every
major region of Tennessee to stimulate the development of community
based services in each geographic area.10 8
Skills Development operates in Tullahoma, Tennessee. Like the
other community centers operating under contract with the state, Skills
Development's board of directors is self appointed and consists of pri-
vate citizens who serve without remuneration. Although Skills Devel-
opment's contract with the state expressly provides that the corporation
is an independent contractor and not a state agency, the state retains,
by the terms of the contract, significant control over the corporation's
activities.10 9 The contract also allows the state to exert significant influ-
ence upon the relationship between the corporation and its employees.
The Department must review and approve any person hired as pro-
gram director at the facility; for all other staff positions, Skills Develop-
ment may hire only persons whose qualifications equal or exceed the
minimum standards established for comparable positions in govern-
mental facilities. 10 The state, which reimburses Skills Development
for the costs of paying its employees, influences-and, in practical ef-
fect, controls-the amounts that these employees are paid by providing
maximum reimbursement rates."' Moreover, the contract requires
108. Id at 9-13.
109. The corporation: (1) may not, without prior written approval of the state, assign the
contract or subcontract for any of the services it is to perform; (2) must submit to audits by
the state and have its budget approved by the state; (3) must comply with the state's competi-
tive bid law; (4) must notify the state in writing at least one month in advance of discharging
a person from the program; (5) may not enroll a person in a program without the state's
consent; (6) must establish a system through which recipients of services may present griev-
ances about the operation of the program; (7) must provide services funded by the contract
only to persons who meet the state's eligibility requirements; and (8) must not collect fees
from persons serviced under the contract without the state's authorization. Plaintiffs' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 17-19, Skills Development Services Corp. v. Donovan, 558
F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
110. Brief for Appellants supra note 105, at 39.
111. The contract provides, for example, that Skills Development's three highest paid
staff positions must be funded in accordance with the state employee compensation plan; the
positions are classified using state job titles and descriptions, and receive the equivalent state
salary. The contract also provides, however, that "this in no way represents either the mini-
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that Skills Development's employees work at least thirty-seven and
one-half hours per week, the same number as state employees. The
contract forbids the corporation to allow its hourly employees to work
overtime without prior state approval, and mandates that the corpora-
tion pay one and one-half times the employees' normal hourly salary
for overtime worked." 2 Finally, the contract requires that Skills De-
velopment be open and available to provide services regardless of
weather conditions, unless the local offices of the Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation and the Department of Human
Services are closed."13
2. The District Court's Opinion
In a very brief opinion, the district court in Skills Development
Services, Inc. v. Donovan 4 denied Skills Development's request for a
declaration that it is entitled to sovereign immunity from the FLSA.
Expressly adopting the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Eastside, 5
the court stated, "[w]hatever nuances might be superimposed upon the
relationship between these plaintiffs and the state, application of the
Act to them does not represent regulation by federal authorities of the
'States as States.' 116 In addressing the question whether the state had
"conferred" sovereignty upon the corporations, the Court observed,
[e]ven assuming arguendo that sovereign rights can be meted out
in this fashion, the contracts themselves disclose that the state did
not intend such a result here. Plaintiffs clearly were not to be
designated by contract as state agencies, but rather were recog-
nized as independent contractors. As such. . . they are entitled
to no deference that might be accorded the states under the Tenth
Amendment.' 17
mum or maximum salaries that a community agency's board of directors can elect to pay its
staff. It does represent the maximum that the Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation will participate toward reimbursement of the salaries." Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 7 n.3, Skills Development Services, Inc. v. Donovan, 558 F.
Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
112. The corporation may not pay its salaried employees time and a half for overtime;
instead, it must grant them compensatory time off on an hour for hour basis after receiving
approval for the overtime work from the state. The hour and one-half ratio corresponds to
the benefits received by state employees. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 20,
Skills Development Services, Inc. v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
113. The contract also prescribes the number of paid holidays the employees may have
and puts restrictions on their sick leave and vacation benefits. Id at 19-20.
114. 558 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn.), ar'd, 728 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1984).
115. 558 F. Supp. at 164.
116. Id
117. Id at 165.
The district court's decision currently is on appeal to the Sixth
Circuit.13
III. Analysis of the Problem
Skills Development, like Richland and Eastside, presents an issue
that was not directly before the Supreme Court in National League of
Cities. As the Eleventh Circuit observed in Eastside, the Court in Na-
tional League of Cities was concerned with the payment of wages by
states or subordinate political bodies; the nature of those entities was
not in dispute.I 9 There are at least three distinct methods of analysis
applicable to the problem of determining whether a nominally private
entity under the contract with the state to perform an integral govern-
ment function should be entitled to sovereign immunity under the
Tenth Amendment. Each of these methods of analysis-the "instru-
mentality" approach, the "retention by contract" approach and the
"political subdivision exemption"-will be discussed in turn.
A. The Instrumentality Approach
The Eleventh Circuit described Eastside as being "analogous to a
private business doing contracting work for the state."120 It is indispu-
table that a corporate entity does not acquire sovereign status simply by
entering into a contract with the government. 21 One might distin-
guish, however, between a corporation under contract to provide a
service to the state and one under contract to perform a traditional gov-
ernment service on behalf of the state. Given the extensive state control
over their activities, Richland, Eastside and Skills Development could
fairly be viewed as agents or instrumentalities of their respective states.
It remains arguable, even after Hodel, that each such instrumentality
should be held to share in the Tenth Amendment protection of the state
with which it contracts.
In NationalLeague of Cities, the majority noted that "[q]uite apart
from the substantial costs imposed upon the States and their political
subdivisions, the [1974 amendments to the FLSA] displaced state poli-
cies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those
governmental services which their citizens require. '  Application of
118. Late in the publication process of this Note, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision that Skills Development Services, Inc. is not entitled to immunity from the
FLSA. Skills Development Services, Inc. v. Donovan, 728 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1984). A sum-
mary and analysis of the Sixth Circuit's opinion appears infra at note 212.
119. See supra note 96.
120. 669 F.2d at 679.
121. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, (1982); United States v. Town-
ship of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958). See also Blum v. Yaretsky, 452 U.S. 991 (1982);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
122. 426 U.S. at 847.
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the FLSA to Richland, Eastside and Skills Services could substantially
increase costs to their respective states or, if the states are unable to
supply the additional funds, may displace the states' policy decision to
structure the delivery of mental health services through local nonprofit
corporations. 123 Moreover, all of these corporations are dependent
upon state funding. Although established as distinct entities outside
the governmental structure, they have received significant governmen-
tal encouragement and might well disappear without state support.
The view that such corporations are state instrumentalities entitled
to sovereign immunity can be supported by precedent from the area of
intergovernmental immunity from taxation. The history of intergov-
ernmental immunity from taxation dates back to McCulloch v. Mary-
land.124  The immunity from state taxation granted federal
instrumentalities in McCulloch was made reciprocal in Collecter v.
Day. 125 Although the scope of the states' immunity from federal taxa-
tion has decreased dramatically in recent years126 and is currently un-
clear,127 it remains a significant consideration because of the majority's
explicit reliance upon it in fashioning the doctrine of state immunity
from federal regulation in National League of Cities.'21
Cases involving state immunity from federal taxation have ad-
dressed the question of whether a particular activity of a state can be
taxed, not whether the entity carrying on that activity should be consid-
ered "the state."' 129 Many cases, however, have considered whether a
particular entity is a federal instrumentality entitled to immunity from
state taxation.130 Less than twenty years ago, in Department of Employ-
ment v. United States,' the Supreme Court decided that a private en-
tity was a federal instrumentality and exempt from state taxation. In
123. Part of the Court's rationale for granting the states immunity from the FLSA in
National League of Cities was the Act's potentially detrimental impact upon "traditional
volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn on to compliment the operation of
many local governmental functions." 426 U.S. at 851-52. In the trilogy of cases discussed in
this Note, the directors of the nonprofit corporations are essentially volunteers whose efforts
to assist their states may be impaired by application of the FLSA to their corporations.
124. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
125. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
126. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978). See generally, Note,
Federal Immunity From State Taxation: A Reassessment, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 695, 708-13
(1980).
127. The Court has been unable to issue a majority opinion in its last two attempts to
define the scope of the states' immunity from federal taxation. See cases cited supra note
126.
128. See 426 U.S. at 843 n.14.
129. See cases cited supra note 126.
130. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982); United States v. Boyd,
378 U.S. 39 (1964); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
131. 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
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Department of Employment, Colorado had sought to impose an unem-
ployment compensation tax upon the Red Cross. The Court stated,
[a]lthough there is no simple test for ascertaining whether an in-
stitution is so closely related to governmental activity as to be-
come a tax-immune instrumentality, the Red Cross is clearly
such an instrumentality. . . . Congress chartered the present
Red Cross in 1905, subjecting it to governmental supervision and
to a regular financial audit by the Defense, then War, Depart-
ment. . . . Its principal officer is appointed by the President,
who also appoints seven (all government officers) of the remain-
ing 49 Governors. . . .By statute and Executive Order there de-
volved upon the Red Cross the right and obligation to meet this
Nation's commitments under varying Geneva Conventions, to
perform a wide variety of functions indispensable to the workings
of our Armed Forces around the globe, and to assist the Federal
Government in providing disaster assistance to the States in time
of need. Although its operations are financed primarily from vol-
untary private contributions, the Red Cross does receive substan-
tial material assistance from the Federal Government. And time
and time again, both the President and Congress have recognized
and acted in reliance upon the Red Cross' status virtually as an
arm of the Government. In those respects in which the Red
Cross differs from the usual government agency-e.g., in that its
employees are not employees of the United States, and that gov-
ernment officials do not direct its everyday affairs-the Red
Cross is like other institutions-e.g., national banks-whose sta-
tus as tax-immune instrumentalities of the United States is be-
yond dispute. 132
The analogy to Richland, Eastside and Skills Development is
readily apparent. Each corporation is subject to regular governmental
supervision and audit, and receives substantial assistance from its re-
spective state. Each is a nonprofit organization, which the Supreme
Court has indicated may be a factor in tax immunity cases. 133 Al-
132. Id at 358-60. Department of Employment was recently cited with approval in
United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1982) in which the Court attempted to
clarify the "seemingly intractable problems posed by state taxation of federal contractors."
455 U.S. at 730. In New Mexico, contractors providing management and construction serv-
ices to the government pusuant to cost-plus contracts with the Department of Energy were
declared not entitled to sovereign immunity from state taxation because they were not "fed-
eral instrumentalities." The Court's opinion described a federal instrumentality as an entity
which, although nominally private, is "virtually ... an arm of the Government," id at 735-
37 (citing Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. at 358-60), and "'so inti-
mately connected with the exercise of a power or the performance of a duty' by the Govern-
ment that taxation of it would be 'a direct interference with the functions of government
itself."' Id at 736 (quoting James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 157 (1937) (quot-
ing Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 524 (1926))).
133. See United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958). In Muskegon,
the Court refused to permit a private corporation under contract with the federal govern-
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though the scope of state immunity from federal taxation is narrower
than the scope of federal immunity from state taxation,134 Department
of Employment clearly indicates that an entity need not be "govern-
mental" in order to be entitled to some form of governmental immu-
nity. Thus, Department of Employment might be used to support a
holding that a nonprofit corporation performing an integral govern-
ment function under strict state supervision is a state instrumentality
entitled to immunity from the FLSA. 35
Nevertheless, it seems appropriate that lower courts have refused
to extend Tenth Amendment immunity to such corporations. By its
terms, National League of Cities grants sovereign immunity only to the
states as employers.1 36  In addition, the opinion states that the "un-
ment to escape state tax liability on the use of federal property within the state. The situa-
tion "might well be different if the Government had reserved such control over the activities
and financial gain of [the company] that it could properly be called a 'servant' of the United
States in agency terms." 355 U.S. at 486.
134. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 455 (1978) in which the Court
stated, "[t]he immunity of the Federal Government from state taxation is bottomed on the
Supremacy Clause, but the States' immunity from federal taxes was judicially implied from
the States' role in the constitutional scheme." Id at 455. See also Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939) ("As [the federal] government derives its authority
wholly from powers delegated to it by the Constitution, its every action within its constitu-
tional power is governmental action, and since Congress is made the sole judge of what
powers within the constitutional grant are to be exercised, all activities of government consti-
tutionally authorized by Congress must stand on a parity with respect to their constitutional
immunity from taxation."); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576-77 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J.,) (criticizing the reciprocity argument for ignoring that the states, due to their repre-
sentation in Congress, have less need than the federal government for the protections of tax
immunity). But see United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936) (intergovern-
mental tax immunity is "equally a restriction on taxation by either of the instrumentalities of
the other").
135. As in the area of federal immunity from state taxation, there would be no precise
test to determine whether an ostensibly private entity performing a traditional governmental
function is so intimately connected with a state or local government that the entity should be
granted sovereign status. Among the factors a court should consider are: (1) the degree and
nature of governmental supervision and control; (2) the extent to which the entity is financed
by the government; (3) whether the entity is exempt from state and local taxes; (4) whether
the entity has been granted any sovereign powers, such as the power of eminent domain. In
determining whether a particular entity should be exempt from the FLSA, a court might
also consider whether the state has retained control over that entity's employee wages and
work schedules. See infra note 163.
136. The Court stated: "[T]he federal requirement directly supplants the considered pol-
icy choices of the States' elected officials and administrators as to how they wish to structure
pay scales instate employment." 426 U.S. at 848 (emphasis added). "[Tihe vice of the Act as
sought to be applied here is that it directly penalizes the States for choosing to hire govern-
mental employees on terms different from those which Congress has sought to impose." Id
at 849 (emphasis added). "We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl.
3." Id at 852 (emphasis added).
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doubted attribute of state sovereignty" affected by application of the
FLSA to the states is the states' "power to determine the wages which
shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their
governmental functions, what hours those persons will work, and what
compensation will be provided where those employees may be called
upon to work overtime."' 137 When a state, by contracting with a non-
profit corporation, leaves these decisions to private individuals, that
state is no longer exercising this "attribute of sovereignty." Despite the
existence of extensive state regulation, the corporation should not be
deemed to be a sovereign entity.
Support for this view can be found in the Supreme Court's recent
decisions regarding "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,' 38 the plaintiffs, five teachers and a voca-
tional counselor, brought an action against their employer-school
claiming they were fired in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 139  The school, although ostensibly private, was
subject to extensive state regulation and dependent upon the state for
its funding. 40  The Court found no state action. In discussing the
school's dependence on state funds, the Court noted,
The school. . . is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to
build roads, bridges, dams, ships or submarines for the govern-
ment. Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the
government by reason of their significant or even total engage-
ment in performing public contracts. 14 1
The Court also reasoned that state regulation, even if extensive
and detailed, does not convert a private entity's actions into "state ac-
tion."' 42 The majority deemed the crucial factor inRendell-Baker to be
that the "decisions to discharge the petitioners were not compelled or
even influenced by any state regulation."143 To the extent they are rele-
137. Id at 845.
138. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
139. Plaintiffs brought their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private
cause of action to any person whose constitutional rights are violated under color of a state
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage. See generally Symposium: Recent Develop-
ments in Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts Litigation, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 457
(1982).
140. The state of Massachusetts provides up to 99% of the school's funds. 457 U.S. at 846
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. 457 U.S. 840-41.
142. Id (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
143. 457 U.S. at 841. See also 457 U.S. at 843-44 (White, J., concurring). In addition,
the Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs' claim that state action was established by virtue of
the school's performing a "public function." The Court observed that education is not
"'traditionally the exclusive perogative of the State."' Id at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). The majority stated "[tlhat a private entity per-
forms a function which serves the public does not make its acts state action." Id
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vant to the question of sovereign immunity under the Tenth Amend-
ment,' Rendell-Baker and its companion case, Blum v. Yaretsky, 145
would seem to require at least that there be direct state involvement in
the decisions regarding the wages and hours of quasi-public employees
before a state could claim that those employees are not entitled to the
protections of the FLSA.
Moreover, the principle of immunity espoused by the Court in Na-
tional League of Cities is apparently more narrow than either the con-
cept of state action or intergovernmental immunity from taxation. The
majority was very consistent in noting that the unconstitutionality of
the 1974 amendments to the FLSA was due to their direct effect on
state governments as employers. 146 It must be acknowledged, of course,
that the specific issue of quasi-public employees was not directly before
the Court. Nevertheless, the Court has thus far refused to expand the
principles of National League of Cities beyond the facts of that case.
Recently, in EEOC v. Wyoming, 147 the Court held that application
of the Age Discrimination Act 148 to the states does not violate the prin-
ciples enunciated in National League of Cities. 149 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, explained the limited nature of the Tenth
Amendment immunity granted the states in National League of Cities.
Brennan reemphasized that, in order to give rise to a claim of immu-
nity, the challenged regulation must directly regulate the "States as
States."15 0 He observed, however, that "not . . . every state employ-
ment decision aimed simply at advancing a generalized interest in effi-
cient management-even the efficient management of traditional state
functions-should be considered to be an exercise of an 'undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty.' "151 Finally, Justice Brennan noted that
whether a particular federal regulation impermissibly interferes with
traditional governmental functions does not depend on "'particular-
ized assessments of actual impact,' which may vary from State to State
and time to time, but on a more generalized inquiry, essentially legal
rather than factual, into the direct and obvious effect of the federal
144. Logic dictates that there can be no sovereign immunity where there is no state
action.
145. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). For a discussion of Blum, see infra notes 165-67 and accompa-
nying text.
146. See supra note 136.
147. 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (5-4 decision).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
149. The majority based its decision upon its determination that the Act "does not 'di-
rectly impair' the State's ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ermental functions."' 460 U.S. at 239.
150. Id at 237.
151. Id at 238. The Justice admitted, however, that "[p]recisely what it meant by an
'undoubted attribute of state sovereignty' is somewhat unclear...... Id.
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legislation on the ability of the states to allocate their resources."' 152
In Richland, Eastside, and Skills Development, the states' decision
to contract with nonprofit corporations to provide mental health serv-
ices can be characterized as merely an employment decision aimed at
advancing a generalized interest in efficient management. Application
of the FLSA to these corporations would not necessarily-although it
might in these particular cases-have a direct and obvious effect on the
ability of the states to allocate their resources. The states have the op-
tion of avoiding the strictures of the FLSA by providing the services
themselves through governmental agencies.
The existence of this option is significant in light of Justice Bren-
nan's statement in EEOC that that case is distinguishable from Na-
tional League of Cities in part because in EEOC "even the State's
discretion to achieve its goals in the way it thinks best is not being over-
ridden entirely, but is merely being tested against a reasonable federal
standard."' 53 Similarly, application of the FLSA to these nonprofit
corporations would not prevent the states from contracting out their
traditional functions; it would merely require the states to comply with
a reasonable federal standard.'54 As Justice Alarcon observed in his
Richland I dissent:
[T]he states have no inherent [T]enth [A]mendment right to de-
mand that contracts with private businesses [must] always be
cheaper or more desirable than providing the services themselves.
The state must come to the private sector as it is, evaluating
whether the private sector, subject as it is to minimum wage laws,
can still provide equivalent services at a lower cost.
Several factors-the limited nature of the Court's holding in Na-
tional League of Cities, 56 the recent cases limiting the scope of "state
action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 157 the apparently
nonreciprocal nature of intergovernmental tax immunity,' 58 and the
Court's reluctance to extend the principles espoused in NationalLeague
152. Id at 240 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52).
153. 460 U.S. at 240 (emphasis in original).
154. On the other hand, it might be argued that the "direct and obvious impact" of re-
quiring these corporations to comply with the FLSA will be to force the states to operate
these establishments themselves and thereby interfere with the states' ability to allocate their
resources to a traditional government service in the manner the states consider to be the
most effective. Such an argument, however, depends upon a "particularized assessment of
actual impact," which, contrary to Justice Brennan's assertion in EEOC, is essentially fac-
tual rather than legal. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. Richland County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Donovan, 91 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
34,018, at 49,685 (Alarcon, C.J., dissenting), withdrawn, Aug. 21, 1981.
156. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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of Cities beyond the facts of that case'59 -indicate that a nonprofit cor-
poration, whose private directors control the hours and wages of the
corporation's employees, should not be viewed as a state instrumental-
ity entitled to share its state's Tenth Amendment immunity from fed-
eral regulation. It remains arguable, however, that requiring such a
nonprofit corporation-one performing an integral governmental func-
tion under state supervision-to comply with the terms of the FLSA
constitutes unconstitutional interference with that state's sovereign
right to determine the best method of providing a traditional govern-
mental service. Until the Supreme Court settles this question, lower
courts should consider the instrumentality approach carefully; if the
instrumentality approach is rejected, the reasons for its rejection should
be clearly articulated.'60
B. Retaining Sovereign Rights by Contract
In Skills Development, the district court entertained the possibility
that sovereign rights might be "meted out" by a state to a private cor-
poration on the basis of the parties' contractual relationship.' 6 ' The
court, however, did not identify how this result might be accomplished.
For purposes of conferring immunity from the FLSA, it seems that the
most appropriate method would be for the state to retain-and to exer-
cise--control over the hours and wages of the corporation's employees.
In National League of Cities, the Court identified the state's ability to
set the wages and hours of governmental employees engaged in the
performance of traditional governmental functions as an "undoubted
attribute of sovereignty."' 62 Where the state retains, by virtue of its
contract with a nonprofit corporation, the decisionmaking power over
159. Several Supreme Court opinions issued after National League of Cities contain lan-
guage narrowing the potential scope of the states' Tenth Amendment immunity from federal
regulation. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n .v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See also supra notes 32, 147-154 and accompanying
text. It should be remembered, however, that Hodel was written by Justice Marshall, that
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n and EEOC were written by Justice Brennan, and that
both Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in National League of Cities. Moreover, both
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n and EEOC, like National League of Cities, were decided
by bare 5-4 majorities. A slight change in the Court's personnel or a change of mind by one
of the Justices might lead to a renewed expansion of the Tenth Amendment principles ar-
ticulated in National League of Cities.
160. As indicated supra at note 118, late in the publication process of this Note, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Skills Development Services, Inc. is not
entitled to immunity from the FLSA. The Sixth Circuit rejected the instrumentality ap-
proach, reasoning that, because intergovernmental immunity from taxation is nonreciprocal,
"cases based on federal immunity to state regulation are irrelevant to the present case." 728
F.2d at 300. For a summary and analysis of the Sixth Circuit's opinion, see infra note 212.
161. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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the wages and hours of that corporation's employees, the state might be
said to have retained its sovereign power. Arguably, application of the
FLSA to the corporation's employees in these circumstances would
constitute a direct application of the Act to the state itself, depriving the
state of its contractual and sovereign right to determine the wages of
the corporation's employees.1
63
The Supreme Court's recent state action decisions lend support to
this approach. As discussed in the previous section, the Court in
Rendell-Baker based its finding of no state action primarily on the fact
that the decisions to discharge plaintiffs were not compelled or even
influenced by the state.' 64 In Blum v. Yaretsky, 165 the companion case
to Rendell-Baker, the plaintiffs were residents of a nursing home who
claimed that the home's unilateral decision to transfer them to a facility
where they would receive a lower level of care violated their due pro-
cess rights. Plaintiffs contended that the action of the home was con-
verted into state action by, inter alia, the state's subsidizing the
facilities' operating and capital costs, licensing of the facilities, and
payment of medical expenses of more than ninety percent of the pa-
tients.' 66 The Court held that there was no state action, and thus no
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the decision to trans-
fer the plaintiffs was not made by the state but by a private doctor
exercising independent medical judgment. 67
Blum and Rendell-Baker indicate that although a combination of
state funding and state regulation will not convert all actions of an
otherwise private entity into state action, if the facts establish that the
particular action complained of is an exercise of state power, state ac-
tion may be found. Similarly, a private entity under contract with a
state to perform an integral governmental function, although not "the
state" for all purposes, might be entitled to sovereign immunity from
the FLSA where the state has retained and is exercising control over
the hours and wages of that corporation's employees.' 68
163. The instrumentality approach and the retention by contract approach are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. In applying the instrumentality approach, one factor a court
might consider is whether the state retains significant control over the particular attribute of
sovereignty impacted by the challenged federal regulation. See supra note 135.
164. See supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
165. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
166. Id at 993.
167. Id at 1009. Plaintiffs also argued that the state commands the summary discharge
or transfer of patients who are thought to be inappropriately placed in their nursing facili-
ties. The Court responded, "[w]ere this characterization accurate, we would have a different
question before us." Id at 1005.
168. The concept is similar to one employed by the NLRB in determining whether a
concededly private entity might, by virtue of its relationship with a local government, be
entitled to immunity from the NLRA under the statutory exemption for political subdivi-
sions. Where a private employer who contracts to provide services to an exempt political
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The arguments against adoption of such an approach are similar
to those advanced against adoption of the instrumentality approach.
National League of Cities expressly grants sovereign immunity only to
the states as employers.169 When a state makes a decision to contract
with a private entity, it has, by its own choice, ceased to be the em-
ployer of the persons providing the traditional governmental service.
Application of the FLSA in these circumstances falls directly upon the
corporate entity as employer and only indirectly on the state as
contractor.
Moreover, even if retention of the power to determine wages and
hours was held to constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, such a finding would not be conclusive of the existence of sover-
eign immunity. 70 Where a state decides to contract with a nonprofit
corporation for the provision of a traditional governmental function, it
is that decision-ie., the state's decision not to perform the particular
function-which should be the focus of a court's inquiry into the exist-
ence of sovereign immunity under the Tenth Amendment. The terms
of the contract should not be controlling.
This view is supported by the following crucial language in EEOC:
The principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cit-
ies is a functional doctrine. . . whose ultimate purpose is not to
create a sacred province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the
unique benefits of a federal system in which the States enjoy a
'separate and independent existence' . . . not to be lost through
undue federal interference in certain core state functions.' 7'
subdivision does not retain sufficient control over the employment relationship to engage in
meaningful collective bargaining, the exempt subdivision is deemed the true employer. See
Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Austin Developmental Center, 606 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1979).
The FLSA defines "employere as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the inter-
est of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976). Where a group
of workers is "jointly" employed by two or more entities that each qualify as a statutory
"employer," each is held to be "responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance
with all of the applicable provisions of the act, including the overtime provisions." 29
C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (1983). Although the joint employer concept typically is used to increase
the coverage of the FLSA, see, e.g., Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 525 F.
Supp. 128, 135-36 (N.D. Cal. 1981), afj'd, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). arguably, where a
state is deemed to be a joint employer under the Act, National League of Cities should apply.
169. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
170. In United Transp. Workers Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that a state's operation of a railroad does not make
that railroad immune from federal regulation. Similarly, in New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572 (1946), the Court held that a state's decision to bottle and market mineral water
does not entitle it to sovereign immunity from federal taxation. In both Long Island R
and New York v. United States, there was clearly "state action," but the nature of the state
action precluded a finding of sovereign immunity.
171. 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983) (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted).
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Applying Brennan's reasoning, it seems improper to view National
League of Cities as having a sacred province of state autonomy over the
wages and hours of all persons performing integral state functions. The
"attribute of sovereignty" identified in NationalLeague of Cities should
not be extended beyond the situation in which the government is itself
providing the service. Only in that situation might the state's "in-
dependent existence" be threatened by application of the FLSA di-
rectly to state employees. Where a state has contracted with a private
entity--even if it retains control over the wages and hours of the em-
ployees-the state retains the option of providing those services itself.
The existence of this option would seem to preclude a finding of Tenth
Amendment immunity.'72
C. The Political Subdivision Exemption
1. The Term In Other Contexts
Even if the "instrumentality" and "retention by contract" ap-
proaches are, as has been argued here, inappropriate methods of deter-
mining whether a corporate entity is entitled to sovereign immunity
from the FLSA, in National League of Cities the Supreme Court ex-
pressly extended the immunity to states and their "political subdivi-
sions." '17 3 The only courts to address the political subdivision
exemption in this context have been the district court and the Eleventh
Circuit in Eastside. 74 The Eleventh Circuit expressly adopted the test
used by the NLRB to determine whether a particular entity is a polit-
ical subdivision entitled to the statutory exemption from the NLRA. 75
The term "political subdivision," however, is far from precise, and is
generally construed according to the particular setting in which it is
used.
172. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. Indeed, given the Court's refusal to
expand the concept of immunity created in NationalLeague of Cities beyond the facts of that
case, the most appropriate question to be asked in this area might not be whether the state is
entitled to immunity from federal regulation, but whether the situation is one in which the
application of a particular federal regulation would be so unavoidably detrimental to the
state's existence that Congress must be estopped from applying its otherwise plenary power
to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
173. 426 U.S. at 855-56 n.20.
174. As indicatedsupra, at note 118, late in the publication process of this Note, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Skills Development Services, Inc. is not
entitled to immunity from the FLSA. The Sixth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit in East-
side, expressly adopted the NLRB criteria. For a summary and analysis of the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinon see infra note 212.
175. 669 F.2d at 677. For a discussion of the Eleventh's Circuit's treatment of this issue,
see supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
The district court did not adopt the NLRB test but merely incorporated it into its alter-
native holding. 509 F. Supp. at 584. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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Preliminarily, it should be noted that the term "political subdivi-
sion" has arisen in another constitutional context. Courts have devel-
oped criteria to determine whether an entity is the "alter-ego" of a state
and thus entitled to sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. 176 The purpose in that situation, however, is to distin-
guish nonimmune "political subdivisions" from immune "alter-egos."
Because National League of Cities extended Tenth Amendment immu-
nity from federal regulation to states and their political subdivisions,
the criteria used in the Eleventh Amendment cases should not be
adaptable to Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
There is a plethora of decisions in which state courts have at-
tempted to give definition to the term "political subdivision." 177 The
decisions are inconsistent, partially because the courts were attempting
to define the term in the context of a particular statute or state constitu-
tional provision. 178
Attempts by federal courts to define the term "political subdivi-
sion" have also generally been within the context of a particular stat-
ute. In NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County, 179 the
176. See, e.g., Blake v. Kline, 462 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated on other grounds,
612 F.2d 718 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). These factors include:
(1) whether any judgment would be payable from the state treasury; (2) whether the entity is
performing a governmental or proprietary function; (3) whether it is separately incorpo-
rated; (4) the degree of autonomy it has over its operations; (5) whether it has the power to
sue and be sued and to enter into contracts; (6) whether its property is immune from state
taxation; and (7) whether the sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for the
entity's operations. 462 F. Supp. at 826. The first of these factors is the most important. See
Obenshain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946, 952 (E.D. Va. 1980); Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois
State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1977).
177. See, e.g., Adamson Co., v. R.E. Benson & Sons, Inc., 40 Pa. Commw. 14, 396 A.2d
907 (1979)per cur/am; French v. Board of Educ., 99 Misc. 2d 882 (1979) 417 N.Y.S.2d 389,
aft'd, 72 A.D.2d 16, 424 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1980); Tymcio v. State, 52 Ohio App. 2d 298, 369
N.E.2d 1063, (1977); Lane Council of Gov'ts v. Lane Council of Gov'ts Employee Ass'n, 26
Or. App. 119, 552 P.2d 600 (1976)rev'd on other grounds, 277 Or. 631,561 P.2d 1012 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 25 Pa. Commw. 66, 358 A2d 750 (1976). See
also Alabama Hosp. Ass'n v. Dillard, 388 So. 2d 903 (1980), in which the Alabama Supreme
Court held that even the hospitals created as public corporations by the State of Alabama
were not political subdivisions under the relevant provision of the Alabama Constitution.
178. Compare Schaefer v. Hilton, 473 Pa. 237, 373 A.2d 1350 (1977) (school district a
"political subdivision" under statutory provision permitting political subdivisions to partici-
pate in or purchase of purchase contracts for equipment, materials, and supplies entered into
by Department of Property and Supplies); Muse v. Prescott School Dist., 233 Ark. 789, 349
S.W.2d 329 (1961) (school district a political subdivision within meaning of provision of
Workmen's Compensation Act) with Ray v. Cobb County Bd. of Educ., 110 Ga. App. 258,
138 S.E.2d 392 (1964) (school board not a political subdivision within Insurance Code provi-
sions) and Cardwell v. Howard, 345 Mo. 215, 132 S.W.2d 960 (1939) (school district not a
political subdivision within constitutional provision for appeal to state Supreme Court in a
case where county or other political subdivision of the state is a party).
179. 402 U.S. 600 (1971).
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Supreme Court based its decision on statutory grounds. 80 In United
States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, ' the Court relied upon
legislative history and congressional intent in defining the term "polit-
ical subdivision" within the context of Voting Rights Act of 1965.182 In
a more recent case, Philadelphia National Bank v. United States,I 3 the
Third Circuit discussed the necessity of developing specific criteria ap-
plicable to a particular statute in order to determine whether an entity
falls within the statutory definition of the term "political subdivi-
sion."'8 4 In finding that Temple University was not a "political subdi-
vision" under the Internal Revenue Code, section 103(a)(1),185 the
Third Circuit relied upon cases decided under that section 8 6 and ex-
pressly dismissed the relevance of any analogy to either the doctrine of
state action 8 7 or the NLRB cases.'
180. The Court found that Congress enacted the political subdivision exemption "to ex-
cept from Board cognizance the labor relations of federal, state, and municipal government
employees, since governmental employees did not usually enjoy the right to strike." Id at
604. In construing the NLRA, neither the NLRB nor the courts are bound by the fact that
other federal agencies treat an entity as a "political subdivision." See Truman Medical
Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1981).
181. 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
182. 435 U.S. at 117-35 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. V 1970)). The Court found
that the term "political subdivision," as used in the Act, included "all entities having power
over any aspect of the electoral process within designated jurisdictions," and not simply
counties or other units of state government that perform the function of registering voters.
Id at 118.
183. 666 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
184. The circuit court addressed the question whether Temple University was a political
subdivision of the State of Pennsylvania so that interest paid to holders of the University's
bonds could be excluded from the bondholders' gross income. 666 F.2d at 835-37. The
court stated, "[W]e must resolve the question in the context of the Internal Revenue Code
itself. . . ." Id at 839.
185. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a)(1)(1976).
186. 666 F.2d at 839-42. The court reviewed the only two cases to discuss the term
"political subdivision" within the meaning of § 103: Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate,
144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945) (Port of New York Authority-
a public corporation created by a compact between New Jersey and New York, granted the
power of eminent domain and limited police power, and governed by a board of commis-
sioners whose members are appointed by the two states-determined to be a political subdi-
vision under the Internal Revenue Code); and Commissioner v. White's Estate, 144 F.2d
1019 (2d Cir. 1944) cert. denied 323 U.S. 792 (1945) (New York's Triborough Bridge Author-
ity, whose commissioners are appointed by government officials and which had been
granted the power of eminent domain and limited police power, determined to be a political
subdivision under the Code). The court found that Shamberg and White were consistent
with the appropriate Treasury regulation, which is concerned primarily with the "three sov-
ereign attributes": the power to tax, the power of eminent domain, and the police power.
666 F.2d at 839. Temple University was without any of these three attributes, and therefore
was found not to be a "political subdivision." Id at 839-41. The court expressly based its
decision on statutory and not constitutional grounds. I.d at 839.
187. The court asserted, "A finding ofjoint activity that may constitute state action does
not.., make a private party a state 'agency' or political subdivision." 666 F.2d at 839.
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As demonstrated by state and federal precedents, the particular
definitions of "political subdivision" are not readily transferable from
one context to another. The statute that has been the focus of the tril-
ogy of cases examined in this Note is the FLSA. The only cases in
which courts construed the term "political subdivision" as used in the
pre-1974 FLSA are Creekmore v. Public Belt Railroad Commission" 9
and Abad v. Puerto Rico Communications Authority. 19 Although the
focus of this Note is the constitutional limitation upon Congress' com-
merce power and not the construction of the FLSA, these two cases are
nevertheless relevant to the present inquiry into the variety of construc-
tions given to the term "political subdivision." In neither case did the
court attempt to set forth specific criteria for determining what consti-
tutes a political subdivision; both relied upon an essentially ad hoc
inquiry.
In Creekmore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the Public Belt Railroad in New Orleans came within the statutory
exemption. The court observed:
The City of New Orleans being a political subdivision of the
State of Louisiana, and the Public Belt Railroad Commission be-
ing one of its duly authorized, functioning departments, we think
it clear that the employer-employee relationship between these
employees and the City and its Commission falls squarely within
the language of [the FLSA] which in defining 'employer' excludes
'any State or political subdivision of a State'.1
91
InAbad, a public corporation authorized by statute to control tele-
phone and telegraph service was declared exempt from the FLSA as a
political subdivision of Puerto Rico. The corporation's directors were
appointed by government officials.' 92 In addition, the corporation had
limited powers of eminent domain and was exempt from taxation of its
property and bonds.' 93 In holding the Puerto Rico Communications
Authority (Authority) to be a political subdivision under the Act, the
Court relied upon the following factors: (1) the Authority was statuto-
rily designated as a public corporation; (2) the Authority had always
been owned and operated as an integral part of the government; (3) the
Authority performed a governmental function; (4) the Department of
188. The Third Circuit reasoned: "That an entity may have some governmental charac-
teristics for certain purposes does not necessarily control its status under a different statutory
scheme." Id
189. 134 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 742 (1943).
190. 88 F. Supp. 34 (D. P.R. 1950).
191. 134 F.2d at 577-78. The court relied in part upon a letter to the railroad in which
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor opined that "[i]f the Public Belt
Railroad System is wholly owned and controlled by the City of New Orleans... the em-
ployees of the Public Belt Railroad System are not subject to the Act." Id at 578.
192. 88 F. Supp. at 35.
193. Id at 36.
Labor had earlier issued an administrative ruling that the Water Re-
source Authority, whose charter provisions were almost identical to the
Authority's, was a political subdivision under the Act. 194
2. "Political Subdivision" As Used In National League of Cities
Creekmore and Abad, of course, cannot be considered authorita-
tive regarding the meaning of the term "political subdivision" as used
in National League of Cities. The Court in National League of Cities
prescribed a constitutional limitation upon the commerce power. Al-
though the Court declared the extension of the FLSA to the states'
political subdivisions to be unconstitutional insofar as that extension
impaired the states' ability to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional government functions, it cannot safely be assumed that the
Court was simply grafting previous judicial declarations regarding the
statutory definition of the term "political subdivision" onto this consti-
tutional limitation. A court attempting to construe the "constitutional
exemption" from the FLSA created for states and their political subdi-
visions must at least begin its efforts by looking to the language and
logic of National League of Cities and its progeny.
The only clue to the meaning of the term "political subdivision" as
used in National League of Cities appears in a footnote:
As the denomination 'political subdivision' implies, the local gov-
ernmental units which Congress sought to bring within the Act
derive their authority and power from their respective States. In-
terference with integral governmental services provided by such
subordinate arms of a state government is therefore beyond the
reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause just as
if such services are provided by the State itself.195
The Court's reference to "local governmental units" indicates that
the term "political subdivision" was meant to include city and county
governmental agencies. States, cities and counties, however, do not al-
ways neatly designate their "subordinate arms" as "government agen-
cies." As the cases discussed above indicate, 9 6 determining an entity's
governmental status is particularly difficult when the entity is sepa-
rately incorporated.
In NationalLeague of Cities, Justice Rehnquist stated that in rela-
tion to Congress' commerce power, "States as States stand on a quite
different footing from an individual or a corporation . .. 9. Argua-
bly, this language evinces the Court's intention to distinguish the states
and their political subdivisions from all corporate entities. The Court
194. Id at 42. The court also relied upon, inter alia, Creekmore, Shamberg's Estate, and
White's Estate. id at 39-41.
195. 426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
196. See supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
197. 426 U.S. at 854.
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did not distinguish between public and private corporate entities. 198
Strictly speaking, even the employees of public corporations are em-
ployees of that corporation and not of a state, city or county
government.
Such a rigid reading of NationalLeague of Cities is inappropriate.
The opinion should not be interpreted to exclude all corporate entities
from the scope of a state's sovereign immunity. State and local govern-
ments have long used corporate entities to perform a variety of govern-
mental functions. To distinguish between state agencies and corporate
entities performing governmental functions purely on the basis of the
latter's corporate structure would be elevating form over substance.
Given the clear distinction made in both National League of Cities and
Hodel between state and local governments on the one hand and pri-
vate individuals on the other, however, the relationship between any
corporate entity and the government must be examined carefully. Sov-
ereign status should be granted to a corporation only where that corpo-
ration is so closely linked with a state or local government that the
corporation cannot fairly be distinguished from a governmental
agency.
Measuring the nature of the relationship between a corporation
and the government is unavoidably a question of degree. Certain pa-
rameters can be identified, however. An entity organized as a private,
nonprofit corporation whose board of directors is self-appointed and
exercises no governmental power, probably should be considered a pri-
vate entity for the purpose of applying the Tenth Amendment princi-
ples set forth in National League of Cities.9 9 On the other hand, a
statutorily designated public corporation owned and operated by the
government, endowed by the legislature with appropriate sovereign
198. As used in this Note, the term "public corporation" refers to an entity statutorily
designated as a "public" or "public benefit" corporation whose assets are owned by a state
or local government. In United Transp. Workers Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S.
678, 684 (1982), the Supreme Court impliedly conceded that such a government owned cor-
poration was "the state" by not addressing the first prong of the Hodel test. The Second
Circuit granted sovereign status to the Long Island Railroad, which recently had been con-
verted from a private stock corporation to a "public benefit" corporation wholly owned by
the government. See 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico
Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845 (1st Cir. 1982)) (state owned public corporation attached
to Puerto Rico's Department of Transportation and Public Works "an integral part of the
Commonwealth government" and entitled to immunity from the FLSA); Alamo v.
Autoridad de Comunicaciones De Puerto Rico, 569 F. Supp. 1434 (D. P.R. 1983) (Puerto
Rico Communications Authority, a state owned public corporation performing an integral
government function, entitled to exemption from FLSA).
State courts attempting to distinguish between "public" and "private" corporations
often rely on the fact that public corporations are owned by the government. See, e.g., York
County Fair Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n 249 S.C. 337, 154 S.E.2d 361 (1967);
Sharon Realty Co. v. Westlake, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 322, 188 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1961).
199. See supra notes 136-57 and accompanying text.
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powers, and managed without a profit motive by public officials surely
would be indistinguishable from any other governmental agency for
the purpose of applying National League of Cities.
The problem, of course, is determining the sovereign status of an
entity that falls somewhere between these two poles. In Eastside, the
Eleventh Circuit's examination of the nature of the relationship be-
tween Eastside and the State of Alabama was appropriate and neces-
sary to a determination of Eastside's sovereign status. The Court's
express adoption of the NLRB test, however, was inappropriate for two
reasons. First, courts have found the test difficult to apply; conse-
quently, the results in cases under the NLRA have been somewhat in-
consistent. °  Second, to the extent that courts adopting the test in
sovereign immunity cases look to NLRB precedent to determine how
the test should be applied, the scope of Congress' power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause will be determined by cases in which a
particular statutory exemption, rather than a constitutional principle,
was at issue.20 ' The following criteria, similar to but somewhat more
restrictive than the NLRB test, would be easier to apply and would
avoid reliance upon the NLRB cases.
Simply stated, an entity which is government owned, managed by
directors appointed by government officials, and statutorily designated
as a public corporation 20 2 should be presumed to be governmental. A
corporation organized as a private, nonprofit corporation should be
presumed to be a private business. Although these presumptions.
should be rebuttable, an examination of a corporation's statutory
designation, the manner in which its directors are selected, and the
200. See generally Kiss, The Effect of National League of Cities on the Political Subdivi-
sion Exemption of the NLRA, 32 LAB. L.J. 786 (1981); Note, he "Political Subdivision"
Exemption of the National Labor Relations Act, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 183 (1977).
Even the NLRB has not been entirely consistent in its decisions concerning the scope of the
"political subdivision" exemption. The Board formerly exempted private employees per-
forming "essential" government functions, see, e.g., Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 NLRB
584 (1975) (volunteer fire department exempt from the Act) but has apparently repudiated
that position, see National Transportation Service, Inc., 240 NLRB 565 (1979).
201. Moreover, courts reviewing NLRB's decisions treat the Board's "construction of the
broad statutory term" with "great respect." NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins
County, 402 U.S. 600, 605 (1971). Although application of the NLRA to the states and their
political subdivisions might violate the Tenth Amendment, see generally Kiss, supra note
200, this issue has not been decided. In any event, it does not seem appropriate that the
NLRB's and the court's attempts to construe the NLRA should now take on constitutional
status. but see Crestline Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 243, 245 n. 1 (6th
Cir. 1982) ("As we understand it, the rationale for the 'political subdivision' exemption has
its ultimate basis in the Tenth Amendment considerations of state Sovereignty and the Elev-
enth Amendment grant of judicial immunity to the states.").
202. For an explanation of the manner in which the term "public corporation" is used in
this Note, see supra note 198.
Summer 19831
914 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:877
ownership of its assets provides a useful starting point for determining
the nature of that corporation's relationship to the state.
Where a state or local government has made the decision to create
a public corporation under government ownership to perform an inte-
gral government function, this may be indicative of the government's
intent to retain governmental control over all decisions made by that
entity. At the very least, a state's decision to establish a public corpora-
tion is more likely to evince such an intent than the decision to contract
with a nonprofit corporation. In addition, government ownership of
the corporation and its assets makes the entity more closely analogous
to a governmental agency than a private business. Because the inquiry
into sovereign status is, in part, a question as to whether the state has
waived its sovereign immunity, factors indicating an intent to retain
governmental control over the corporation support the initial applica-
tion of the presumption of sovereign status.
Even a statutorily designated public corporation under govern-
ment ownership might not be entitled to the presumption of sovereign
status under all circumstances. In order to be entitled to the presump-
tion of sovereign status the corporation should, at a minimum, be man-
aged by directors who are appointed by government officials.20 3 Where
a government owned public corporation's directors are self-appointed
or appointed by private agencies, that corporation is not necessarily
"governmental" despite its other attributes. The waiver of government
control over the entity's administration represented by the private ap-
pointment of its directors, puts the entity's sovereign status at risk and
no presumption should be applied. A court attempting to determine
the Tenth Amendment status of a government owned public corpora-
tion under private administration can only examine carefully all of the
facts and circumstances of the entity's relationship to the state to deter-
mine whether the entity is more closely analogous to a government
agency or to a government regulated private corporation. The corpora-
tion's possession of such attributes as the power of eminent domain or
the police power, however, should weigh in favor of the corporation's
sovereign status.
When a public corporation is managed by government officials or
government appointees and the presumption of sovereign status is ap-
plied, that presumption might be rebutted by such factors as the failure
to grant the corporation appropriate sovereign powers, a lack of control
exercised over the corporation by government officials, or any other
203. Substantially all of the corporation's directors should be appointed by government
officials. If, because of unusual circumstances, a board retains one member who is the repre-
sentative of a private agency, the corporation should still be entitled to the presumption of
governmental status. It should not be required that the appointing government officials be
elected officials. The focus of a court's inquiry should be the entity's relationship to the
government rather than to the electorate.
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factors evincing a governmental intent to waive control over the ad-
ministration of the entity. The precise nature of the facts necessary to
rebut the presumption will vary from case to case; it would be impossi-
ble to devise a precise formula. A government owned public corpora-
tion managed by government appointed directors, however, will
typically be virtually indistinguishable from any other government
agency. The presumption of sovereign status running in favor of such
an entity should be deemed rebutted only where the facts clearly indi-
cate that the entity was intended to be nongovernmental.
The initial presumption that an ostensibly private, nonprofit cor-
poration does not have sovereign status could also be rebutted. For
example, a state might provide that an entity incorporated under the
state's nonprofit corporations statute have its directorships filled by
government officials or by persons appointed by government officials.
If such a corporation has been given sovereign powers" and there are
other circumstances indicating that it is, in substance, a government
agency, a court might find the presumption of nongovernmental status
overcome and deem the corporation a sovereign entity. The presump-
tion, however, should not be rebutted easily. Although a precise
formula is neither possible nor desirable, much more than a showing of
government funding and regulation should be required. At a mini-
mum, the directors should be government appointees.
In sum, a public corporation managed by government officials or
government appointees should be presumed to have sovereign status.
In the unusual event that a public corporation is managed by self-ap-
pointed or privately appointed directors, no presumption should apply;
a court should look to all of the facts and circumstances of the entity's
relationship with the state to determine whether the entity is more
closely analogous to a government agency or to a government regu-
lated private corporation. An entity organized as a private, nonprofit
corporation should be presumed to be nongovernmental.
204. If a governmental body intends to confer governmental status upon an ostensibly
private corporate entity, it should be willing to grant that entity certain important govern-
mental powers. Among the most important of these sovereign powers are the power of emi-
nent domain, the power to tax, and the police power. While it should not be necessary for a
corporate entity to possess all of these powers in order to acquire governmental status, the
possession of appropriate governmental powers would be strong indicators of such status.
The withholding from a corporate entity of so fundamental a governmental power as the
power of eminent domain would indicate that the corporation was not intended to possess
full governmental status. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53
(1974) (actions of a privately owned utility company did not amount to "state action" under
the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court observed, "[i]f we were dealing with the exercise by
[the utility] of some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with
sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our case would be quite a different one.").
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Conclusion
In EEOC v. Wyoming, Justice Brennan pointed out that proper
application of the principles articulated in National League of Cities
depends upon "considerations of degree."20 5 Such considerations have
long been present in cases in which courts were forced to determine
whether a particular quasi-governmental entity is "the state" or a
"political subdivision" for purposes of a particular constitutional or
statutory provision.206 It remains arguable that quasi-public state in-
strumentalities are entitled to sovereign status under the Tenth Amend-
ment.20 7 It also remains arguable, particularly in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the concept of state action under
the Fourteenth Amendment, that a state might be able to retain its im-
munity from the FLSA in contracting with an ostensibly private entity
by retaining control over the particular attribute of sovereignty regu-
lated by that Act.208 By its terms, however, National League of Cities
applies only to government employees. 20 9 Given the Court's refusal to
expand the scope of the states' immunity from federal regulation be-
yond the facts of that case, it seems that neither the instrumentality
approach nor the retention by contract approach is a proper method of
determining whether a corporate entity is entitled to sovereign immu-
nity from federal regulation.
Immunity from federal regulation, however, does extend to the
states' "political subdivisions." Although the Court in National League
of Cities did not explicitly define what it meant by "political subdivi-
sions," the brief explanation provided, as well as the context in which
the term was used, indicates that it was meant to include only govern-
mental entities.21 A public corporation under government ownership
whose directors are appointed by government officials should be pre-
sumed to have governmental status. This presumption could be rebut-
ted'by such factors as a showing that the government has failed to
retain sufficient control over the corporation's directors and/or has
failed to delegate to the corporation appropriate governmental powers.
Nonprofit corporations should be presumed to be private businesses.
Although this presumption might be rebutted in very narrow circum-
stances, 21 I neither Richland, Eastside, nor Skills Development is suffi-
ciently controlled by its respective state nor possesses sufficient
governmental power to be entitled to sovereign status under the Tenth
205. 460 U.S. 226, 239.
206. See supra notes 177-201 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 120-35 and accompaning text.
208. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 136.
210. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
Amendment.21 2
212. As indicated supra, at note 118, late in the publication process of this Note the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Skills Development Services, Inc. is not
entitled to immunity from the FLSA. The circuit court rejected the argument that Skills
Development is entitled to immunity as a state instrumentality, citing a portion of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in New York v. United States in which the Justice declared that "'[t]he
considerations bearing upon taxation by the States of activities or agencies of the federal
government are not correlative with the considerations bearing upon federal taxation of
State agencies or activities.'" 728 F.2d at 300 (quoting 326 U.S. at 577). Justice Frank-
furter's observation regarding the nonreciprocal nature of intergovernmental immunity was
certainly relevant to the Sixth Circuit's inquiry into the applicability of the instrumentality
approach in Skills Development. The fact that the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity
from taxation is not precisely reciprocal, however, does not necessarily dictate that the in-
strumentality approach has no relevance to the concept of state immunity from federal regu-
lation. See supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
The Sixth Circuit did not discuss the "retention by contract" approach. As noted
above, the contract between Skills Development and the State of Tennessee does not give
Tennessee direct control over the wages of the corporation's employees; it provides for max-
imum reimbursal rates and puts certain restrictions on both overtime work and the compen-
sation paid for such work. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Thus, the "retention
by contract" situation was not truly before the court. The Sixth Circuit did address Skills
Development's contention that under the FLSA the corporation and the State of Tennessee
are '"joint employers." See supra note 168. The court found that because Tennessee had not
been joined as a party to the action, the "joint employer" rule was irrelevant to the disposi-
tion of the case. 728 F.2d at 300-01. Thus, the relevance of this statutory concept when the
contracting state has been joined as a party remains unclear.
The Sixth Circuit also rejected Skills Development's argument that it is an immune
"political subdivision." The court adopted the NLRB criteria and, relying upon precedent
decided under the NLRA, found that Skills Development did not meet either prong of the
NLRB test. 728 F.2d at 299-300. As its rationale for adopting the NLRB criteria in this
circumstance, the court cited Crestline Memorial HospitalAss'n, Inc. v. NLRB, 728 F.2d at
199 n.5 (citing 668 F.2d 243, 245 n.l (6th Cir. 1982)). In Crestline the court found that the
NLRA's political subdivision exemption is based upon Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
considerations of state sovereignty. See supra note 201.
The propriety of the Sixth Circuit's use of the NLRB criteria and NLRA precedent
remains suspect. First, in Crestline the court cited no authority for its "understanding" that
the NLRA's political subdivision exemption had its "ultimate basis in Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment considerations." See 668 F.2d at 245 n. . That "understanding" is at odds
with the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility of Haw-
kins County that the NLRA political subdivision exemption is based upon considerations
peculiarly applicable to that statute. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit's reliance upon the precedent decided under the NLRA ignores the fact
that in deciding NLRA cases, courts properly treat with "great respect" the NLRB's deter-
mination as to the applicability of the statutory exemption. See supra note 201. Thus, the
use by courts of the NLRB criteria in determining the nature and extent of the Tenth
Amendment limitations upon Congress' regulatory power remains arguably inappropriate.
The use of the criteria proposed in this Note-which have as their conceptual basis the
attempt to distinguish between those entities which are virtually indistinguishable from
other government agencies and those entities which are not-has a sounder conceptual foun-
dation than does the use of the NLRB criteria.
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